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Introduction 
Stephen Cole Kleene was at heart a constructivist who treated unavoidable uses of 
the law of excluded middle the way early twentieth-century mathematicians treated 
uses of the Axiom of Choice. His work on recursive fimctions and the foundations of 
intuitionistic mathematics aimed at establishing the constructive viewpoint as a useful 
and comprehensible refinement of the classical. The number-realizability interpretation 
developed for intuitionistic number theory by Kleene [4] and formalized by David 
Nelson [ 181 gives a classicaily comprehensible “outer model” of the theory; this work 
complements GGdel’s earlier negative translation [ 11, which shows that intuitionistic 
number theory “is only apparently narrower than the classical one, and in truth contains 
it, albeit with a somewhat deviant interpretation.” 
Giidel goes on to say, “Intuitionism appears to introduce genuine restrictions only 
for analysis and set theory; these restrictions, however, are due to the rejection, not 
of the principle of the excluded middle, but of notions introduced by impredicative 
definitions.” In order to communicate and argue effectively for these restrictions it 
was necessary to axiomatize a significant part of Brouwer’s analysis and set theory, a 
task which fell mainly to Brouwer’s student Arend Heyting. Unfortunately Heyting’s 
formalism did not lend itself to comparison with the classical systems and his analysis 
perpetuated a well-disguised circularity in Brouwer’s “proof” of his “bar theorem” (see 
[2], corrected in the third edition). 
Attracted by Brouwer’s view of the continuum as a structure whose elements are 
not all individually knowable, but about which (for this very reason) one can draw 
some powerful conclusions from which the classical mathematician shrinks, Kleene 
[lo] uncovered the axiomatic character of the “bar theorem.” He developed a usable 
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formalization of intuitionistic second-order number theory (“analysis”) as a one-schema 
extension FIM of a neutral system B (“the basic system”), from which classical anal- 
ysis C can be obtained by adjoining as axiom schema either the classical law of 
double negation 77A > A or the law of excluded middle A V 7A. Using number the- 
oretic functions rather than numbers as realizing objects, he developed and (in [9]) 
formalized within B a new realizability interpretation establishing the consistency of 
FIM relative to its neutral subsystem. This achievement, ogether with Vesley’s for- 
malization in FIM of the intuitionistic theory of real-number generators (Chapter III 
of [lo]), made it feasible for a classical mathematician to treat intuitionistic analy- 
sis as a divergent alternative to classical analysis, much as Euclidean geometers un- 
derstand elliptic and hyperbolic geometries. Kleene’s pioneering work, and Kreisel’s 
somewhat different axiomatization of intuitionistic analysis, have inspired hundreds of 
realizability, topological, and topos models of intuitionistic systems diverging from the 
classical. 
This paper presents a classical consistency proof for a strong formal system S ex- 
tending FIM, in a language xplicitly distinguishing between “lawlike” and arbitrary 
choice sequences, A defined class of “lawless” sequences atisfies Kreisel’s principle 
of open data (and the complementary principle of closed data) for formulas whose 
arbitrary choice quantifiers are restricted to range over independent lawless sequences. 
Moreover, S has a classically consistent extension S+ whose lawlike part is just clas- 
sical analysis. Thus the intuitionistic ontinuum appears as a proper extension of the 
classical continuum, and Brouwer’s continuous interpretation of the quantifier combi- 
nation Vla3x seems to express the fact that most intuitionistic hoice sequences are not 
completely determined objects. ’ Partial functions defined only on the lawlike part of 
the continuum may be discontinuous there but all total functions must be continuous 
because most of the continuum presents uch a disorderly aspect o our finite minds. 2 
Luwlike, Choice and Lawless Sequences 
L. E. J. Brouwer’s intuition of the “universal spread” (i,ntuitionistic Baire space cum) 
distinguishes between the notion of a general choice-sequence and that of a “sharp 
arrow” or “lawlike sequence”. A choice sequence’ may be given by freely choosing 
integers, one after another, so that at any stage only a finite initial segment is de- 
termined. A sharp arrow, in contrast, is a choice sequence for which all choices are 
predetermined. Brouwer considers also mixed forms, sequences in which the allowable 
further choices may be restricted at each stage by specifying a subspread of the spread 
specified at the preceding stage, even to the point of specifying completely all further 
’ Because lawlike sequences are completely determined, they can be considered as classical objects; indeed, 
classical mathematicians behave as though all possible number-theoretic sequences existed as completed 
entities in a Platonist world of mathematical ideas. 
* In [16] all partial functions defined on the lawlike part were locally continuous. The current viewpoint 
seems to be essential for the deviant classical interpretation of the lawlike part described above. 
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values so the sequence becomes lawlike at some stage, though it may not have been 
initially. 3 
Troelstra [20] suggests the name “hesitant” for any choice sequence which may 
eventually become lawlike. Kreisel [l l] suggests calling “lawless” any sequence for 
which it is determined in advance that no restrictions on individual choices will ever 
be entertained; every property of such a sequence must depend only on finitely many 
values together with the fact that it is lawless. Intensionally at least, no sequence may 
be both lawless and hesitant, but it is easy to imagine sequences which are neither; 
for example, values at even stages could be lawlike and at odd stages lawless, or the 
nth value could be selected from one of two divergent lawlike sequences according as 
the nth value of a lawless sequence was even or odd. 
Kleene and Vesley’s formalization FIM has one type of variable ranging over choice 
sequences, while Kreisel and Troelstra use two (lawlike and lawless). In [8] Kleene 
argued that the general recursive functions could reasonably play the role of the lawlike 
functions, even to existential instantiation: if a sentence of the form @A(/?) is provable 
in (an inessential extension of) FIM, so is A({e}) for some numeral e (cf. [9]). In the 
same paper he replied to those who criticized FIM for its liberal notion of spread law, 
“so-to-speak, the fencing within which one must stay along any path of successive free 
choices,” saying “... what is essential to the spread concept is not that the choice law 
be constructive (as ordinarily), but merely that it be fixed and knowable potentially 
ad infinitum, in advance of making the choices for any member of the spread.” Thus 
each choice sequence determines a spread with only itself as member, the spread 
law being constructive relative to the unique choice sequence which obeys that law. 
Such a spread is the intuitionistic equivalent of the singleton set of a classical real 
number. 
Kleene’s function-realizability interpretation of FIM uses the idea of relative law- 
likeness, as modeled by relative general recursiveness. His example ([5], repeated in 
[lo] Lemma 9.8) of a tree with an infinite branch, but only finite recursive branches, 
shows that the Bar Theorem fails intuitionistically and classically when the universe 
of choice sequences is restricted to the general recursive functions. We need a more 
inclusive notion of definability to get a class of “lawlike sequences” for which the Bar 
Theorem holds. 
The notion of lawless sequence, which Kreisel presented as essentially intensional 
and incompatible with classical analysis, does not occur in Kleene’s published work. 
In [ 15-171 I introduced an extensional notion of relative lawlessness and used it to 
model classical and intuitionistic theories of lawlike, choice and lawless sequences. In 
this paper I adapt this notion to give a (nonconstructive) realizability interpretation 
for a system S+ simultaneously extending FIM and lawlike “classical analysis.” The 
3 Heyting [3] says “Brouwer was led to the introduction of.. choice sequences by the question what is the 
exact meaning of a generalizing quantifier ranging over all sequences of natural numbers Most theorems 
on all sequences are valid independently of the hypothesis that the sequence is determined by a law. It 
is sufficient to suppose that the components of the sequence are determined one after the other, no matter 
by which means.” 
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subsystem S obtained by omitting the law of excluded middle for restricted formulas is 
a reasonably satisfactory intuitionistic theory of lawlike, choice and lawless sequences 
extending FIM. 
1. Axiomatization 
1.1. The Intuitionistic System S 
This is an extension of FIM in a formal language _I? with variables (with or without 
numerical subscripts) i, j, . . . , x, y, z for numbers; a, b, c, d, e, g, h for lawlike sequences; 
and CI, /?, . . . for arbitrary choice sequences. There are also finitely many (lawlike) 
function constants fe, . . . , fP expressing primitive recursive functions fo,. . . , f,, and 
Church’s 1. We abbreviate by RLS(a) a particular almost negative formula to be 
given in the next section. In the intended interpretation (which the reader should keep 
in mind) the lawlike sequence variables range over a given denumerable class R of 
lawlike sequences indexed by a countable ordinal ~0, while RLS is the class of all 
choice sequences a which are “lawless relative to R.” 
The basic formal system BR (the analog of BD in [ 16, 171) adapts Kleene’s [lo] 
axiomatization of the common portion of intuitionistic and classical analysis to the 
three-sorted language. Its logical axioms are those of intuitionistic predicate logic with 
equality between numbers (equality between functions being defined extensionally), ex- 
tended to 9, with the new axiom schemata A(g) 3 3aA(a) and VaA(a) 3 A(g) and the 
new rules of inference A(a) > C/3aA(a) > C and C > A(a)/C > VaA(a), where g is any 
R-functor free for a in A(a) and a is not free in C. 4 The non-logical axioms inherited 
from Kleene’s basic system B are those of primitive recursive number theory (including 
the defining axioms for fo, fi, . . . , f,), A-elimination, extensionality x = y > LX(X) = a(y), 
the axiom schema of countable choice Vx3aA(x, a) > @VxA(x, lyb((x, y))) for all for- 
mulas A(x,a) in which /?, x are free for a, and the bar theorem in the form which 
assumes each choice sequence intersects the bar exactly once (so the bar predicate is 
decidable), all extended to 9. 
Let RLS(a) abbreviate a particular almost negative formula to be specified in Sec- 
tion 4.2. A formula E of 9 is restricted if each arbitrary choice sequence quantifier 
VU, 3c( occurring in E is explicitly restricted by the condition RLS([a, PO,. . , pk_ I]) 
where ~1, PO,. . . , Pk-1 include all the distinct choice sequence variables occurring free 
within the scope of the quantifier and [a, PO,. . . ,&.-I] is the merge of CI, PO,. . . , flk-1 
(cf. [17]). 
The new basic system BR is completed by the lawlike comprehension principle: 
‘2.2!R. Vx3!yA(x, y) > 3aVxA(x, a(x)) 
4 An R-functor is any fonctor without free occurrences of arbitrary choice sequence variables. Similarly for 
“R-term” and “R-formula.” Observe that Va3a(a = E) is provable in BR. 
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for every restricted R-formula A(x,y) in which a and x are free for y. From ‘2.2!R 
follows as in [14], for every restricted R-formula A(x, a) in which x is free for a: 
*2.1!R. Vx’x!aA(x,a)>3aVxA(x,[a],) 
where in general [a], abbreviates Ibya((x, y)). 
We extend BR to RLS by adjoining restricted axioms and axiom schemata concern- 
ing relatively lawless sequences. The density axioms are 
“RLSl. Vw[Seq(w) > 3c@LS(x) & M E w)], 
xRLS2. V’a[RLS(a) > Vw[Seq(w) > 3/@LS([cl,p]) & /I E w)]] 
where in general CI E w abbreviates Z(lh(w)) = w. 
The principles of open and closed data, for properties of lawless sequences defined 
by restricted formulas A(a) containing free no arbitrary choice sequence variables but 
n and in which p is free for z, are 
‘RLS3. Va[FUS(a) >[A(a) > 3w(a E w & Vj3[RLS(/?) >[/I E w > A(@]])]], 
‘RLS4. Va[RLS(cc) >vw(a E w > 3fi[RLS(p) & p E w & A(p)]) > A(a)]]. 
The last axiom schema of RLS is effective continuity plus choice over the lawless 
sequences, for any restricted formula A(a, b) in which e, a, y are free for b and no 
arbitrary choice sequence variables but c1 occur free: 
xRLS5. Va[RLS(a) > 3bA(a,b)] > 3e3bV#US(a) > 3!ye(E(y)) > 0 & 
Vy(e@(y)) > 0 1 A(a, bL(i(,)) -I 111. 
The complete intuitionistic system S comes from RLS by adjoining the Kleene- 
Troelstra principle for functions: 
“KTl. Va[A(a) > 3/3B(a,fi)] > 3zVa[A(a) >Vx3!yr((x) * Z(y)) > 0 & 
V’BIYX~Y~(M * E(Y)) = P(x) + 11 Wa,8>11 
for all almost negative formulas A(a) and all formulas B(a,/?) with a,p distinct. The 
Kleene-Troelstra principle for numbers 
*KT2. Va[A(a) > 3xB(cx, x)] > 3rVa[A(a) > 3! yz(E(y)) > 0 & 
VY[@(Y)) > 0 3 B(a,@(y)) -1 Ill 
is an easy corollary, for all almost negative A(a) and all B(a, x) in which r, a, y are 
free for x. ’ The strong continuity schema ‘27.1 of [lo], called by Kleene “Brouwer’s 
principle for functions,” follows from ‘KTl by setting A(a) E 0 = 0. 
Various other continuity principles are theorems of S; for example, if B(a,x) is 
restricted and contains free no arbitrary choice sequence variables but a, then 
*KT3. Va3! xB(a, x) > 3eVa [3! ye@(y)) > 0 & Vy(e(E(y)) > 0 > B(a, e@(y)): I ))] 
by an interesting argument which the reader is invited to discover. Thus every total 
function definable by a restricted formula has a lawlike (total) modulus of continuity. 
5 The “almost negative” restriction on A is mandatory here; see [ 10, 16, 171 
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1.2. The Classical System RI_9 and the Combined System S+ 
We obtain RLS from RLS, and S from S, by first replacing the lawlike compre- 
hension principle “2.2!R by the lawlike axiom of countable choice ‘2.1R (like *2.1 !R 
but without the !, and with the same restrictions on A(x,a)), and replacing ‘I&S4 by 
the axiom schema 
‘RLS6. V’a[RLS(cr) > A(a) v lA(a)] 
where A(a) must be restricted and have no free arbitrary choice sequence variables but 
CI. For S+ we also omit ‘lUS3. RLS, S are subsystems of RLS, S respectively, 
since ‘RLS4 is equivalent to %I.,S3 in RLS and *IUS3 follows from ‘IUS and 
*KT2 in S. 
Observe that “RLS 1,6 imply A V ?A for any formula A in the fragment _fZ- of 
Y without arbitrary choice sequence variables. Since the lawlike axiom of count- 
able choice classically implies that the lawlike sequences satisfy the bar theorem for 
properties expressible in 9-, the lawlike fragment of S or RLS may be thought 
of as classical analysis. In S +, ‘IUS says that the lawless sequences behave like 
classical objects within the intuitionistic continuum, at least for properties which can 
be expressed in terms of lawlike, and relatively independent lawless, sequences. 6 Of 
course, one could reject ‘RLS6 in favor of its weaker consequences, but the classi- 
cal realizability interpretation (assuming a powerful oracle) will verify the decidability 
property and so we lose nothing by including it in the formal system. 
Since RLS(u.) is almost negative and contains only a free, ‘KTl implies that every 
function from RLS to wo is locally continuous on its domain. However, we no longer 
claim local continuity of functions with domain R. This difference is reflected in the 
requirement of almost, rather than near, negativity for A(tx) in ‘KTl. 7 
1.3. Wellordering the Lawlike Sequences 
In our model the class of lawlike sequences, unlike the class of all choice sequences, 
will be well ordered by the process of its generation. We extend RLS to RLS+[+] by 
extending all axiom schemata and rules of inference to the language _Y[+], admitting 
as additional prime formulas all formulas of the form u 4 v where u and v are functors, 
and adjoining the equality axioms for 4: 
xwo. cc=p&a<y>P+y, 
/?=y&a+/?>a<y, 
together with the axioms for a linear ordering 
“Wl. ‘v’aVb[a + b > -b 3 a], 
6 Two lawless sequences a, p are independent if their merge [a, b] is lawless. 
7 Recall that a formula of Y is nearly negative if it contains no V or 3 except in subformulas of the 
form 3aVx(a(x) = t) (t any term not containing a free) or 3xP,3aP, 3clP (P prime); almost negative if it is 
nearly negative and has no subformulas of the form 3aVx(a(x) = t). 
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“W2. VaVbVc[a+b&b+c>a+c], 
‘W3. Va’v’b[a+bVa=bVb+a] 
and the axiom schema of <-induction 
“W4. Va[‘v’b(b + a I A(b)) > A(a)] > VaA(a) 
where A(a) is any restricted R-formula in which b is free for a. Finally, the domain 
of 4 is weakly specified by 
‘W5. !x+/I>~VaVb~(cx=a&fl=b).* 
The wellordering of R allows us to keep “2.2!R as an axiom of RLS[+] in place of 
‘2.1R; then the restricted lawlike principles of countable choice (*2.1R) and relativized 
dependent choices 
*RDC-R. Va[A(a) > 3b(B(a, b) & A(b))] > 
va[A(a) 1 Nb10 = a & WB([clx, kL+l > & A([cl,+~ ))I1 
(where A, B are restricted R-formulas) become theorems. The trick is to always choose 
the +-least lawlike candidate, so no arbitrary choices need ever be made. 
S+[+] comes from RLS+[+] by adjoining the axiom schema ‘KTl where A(N) is 
now required to be strictly almost negative (cf. $3.1.). From the classical point of view, 
S+[+] is a theory of the intuitionistic continuum ww as an expansion of the wellordered 
classical continuum R, which is small relative to Ow. The sense in which R is “small” 
is open to interpretation; it need not mean “countable,” it could mean simply “small 
enough to be wellordered.” The sequences lawless relative to R may be thought of as in- 
formationally random reals; in our model they are generic with respect to properties de- 
finable by restricted formulas over the countable class of lawlike reals, and they form an 
uncountable (indeed Baire comeager) definable subclass of the intuitionistic continuum. 
2. A Classical Model of RLS’[+] 
We begin by inductively defining a class R of “lawlike” functions and an associated 
wellordering + of R, as in [ 151, but with a different restriction for closure under lawlike 
comprehension. The usual countability assumption leads to a notion of lawlessness 
relative to R. 
2.1. Dejinition of R 
Let Eo(x,Y),~(x,Y),... be an enumeration of all restricted R-formulas in the lan- 
guage _%‘[<I having free no number variables except possibly the particular distinct 
variables x and y, with Eo(x, y) = a(x) = y. For each i let Fi = Vx 3! yEi(x, y). 
’ Theorem 2 fails if the intuitionistic circumlocution +‘a&- in ‘W5 is replaced by the classically equi- 
valent 3a3b. Van Lambalgen has observed that the Axiom of Open Data implies that no well ordering of 
the R-lawless sequences, and hence no well ordering of the intuitionistic continuum, can be defined by a 
restricted formula without additional choice sequence parameters. 
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If ao,. . . , ak_i is the (possibly empty) list of the distinct variables occurring free in 
Fi in order of first free occurrence, and if A c ww, +A well-orders A, 4 E (“CO and 
&, . . . , I)~_I E A, then Ei defines 4 over (A, +A) from &,. . , $k_, if and only if, when 
I, 0,’ ) f, ‘, . . . ) fP, = are interpreted naturally, number variables range over cu, lawlike 
function variables over A, and arbitrary function variables over Oo, and as,. . . ,ak-1 
are interpreted by $0,. . . , tik-1 and 4 by +A: 
(i) Fi is true classically, and 
(ii) for X, y E w: C&X) = y if and only if Ei(x, y) is true classically. 
Now let Def(A, +A) be the class of all C$ E wo which are definable over (A, +A) by 
some Ei, from some I,&. . . , tik-1 E A. 
In general, if + well-orders A and 4, $ E Def(A, +), set 4 +* $ if and only if 
AA(+) < AA($), where AA($) is the smallest tuple (i,&, . . . . tik-1) in the lexico- 
graphic well-ordering < of OU U,,,(o x Ak ) determined by < on w and 3 on A such 
that Ei defines 4 over A from $0,. . . , t&-l. Observe that if 4 E A then AA($J) = (0,4), 
so (A, 3) is (isomorphic to) an initial segment of (Def(A, -c), +*). 
Define Ro = 0, -Q,= 0; Ry+l = Def(Rc, -$), +[+I= (-Q)*; and at limit ordinals 
take unions. 
Since each Rg c Ry+l c Oo, by cardinality considerations there is a least ordinal QI 
such that R,, = R,,+,; for this ~0 let 
R = R,, = u Ry, -+=+, . 
~EOR 
Since each -Q well-orders Ry and is an initial segment of ++I, +R well-orders R. 
Since R and +R are AT definable over ww, we may consistently assume that R is 
countable. g 
Let x : w x o + (0, 1) code a wellordering of ~0 and let r : w + R be a bijection 
witnessing simultaneously the countability of R and (via x) the order of generation of 
its elements, so that for each n, m E w : 
2.2. Lawlessness Relative to R 
Thanks to a comment by Robert Solovay, reinforcing an earlier suggestion by Joseph 
Shoenfield, the following definition simplifies that in [ 171 though the notion is iden- 
tical. For closure properties of RLS and a characterization in terms of forcing 
see [15-171. 
Definition. A predictor ii any function rc which maps sequence numbers to sequence 
numbers. A choice sequence a is lawless relative to R if and only if for each predictor 
9 The assumption that every A: definably well ordered subclass of Ow is countable is classically consistent 
with ZFC, as shown e.g. by Levy in [13]. No enumerating function can itself be lawlike, since R is closed 
under recursive operations and if 6 enumerates R then for no n E w is ~It([&(t) + 1) = [&I,. 
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rt E R there is some x E w such that R correctly predicts c( at x: 
Ix E Z(x) * 7@(x)). 
We write RLS for the class of sequences lawless relative to R. 
The abbreviation RLS(CX) used in the axiomatizations in Section 1 is of the following 
formula which expresses that CI is lawless relative to R: 
RLS(a) 5 Vbpw(Seq(w) > Seq(b(w))) > 3x$x + lh(b(Z(x)))) = E(X) * b@(x))]. 
Lemma 1. Zf CY is lawless relative to R then so is a o y jix every bijection (i.e. per- 
mutation of o) y E R. Hence a choice sequence is lawless relative to R if and only 
if it is R-lawless in the sense of [ 15-171. 
Proof. Let rc, y E R, where rc is a predictor and y is a permutation of o. We define 
a predictor 0 with the property that if CJ correctly predicts c( at x, then 7-t correctly 
predicts IX o y somewhere. From the definition it will be clear that [T E R, and the 
lemma follows. 
If m is not a sequence number let o(m) = 0. Given any sequence number U, let uoy 
be the sequence number of length n = max{i 1 y(i) < lb(u)} + 1 such that for all 
itn: 
tuo Y)i= 
CU)y(i) if y(i) < lb(u), 
1 if y(i) 3 lb(u). 
Let v = (U o y) * n(u o y). Let (T(U) be the sequence number of length k = 
max{y(i) 1 i < lb(v)} + 1 - lb(u) such that for all j < k : 
(g(u))i = { (1%+,h(ull if r-‘(j + lb(u)) < lb(v), 
if r-‘(j + lb(u))> lb(v). 
Suppose CI E u * a(u). Then a o y E v, by the following argument. If i < /h(v), then 
y(i) < lh(u * a(u)) = k + lb(u). 
Case 1. y(i) = j + lb(u) for some j < k. Then (v), = (o(u)), = ct(j + lb(u)) + 1. 
Case 2. y(i) = j for some j < lb(u). Then (u)i = (U o y)i = (u)j = LX(~) + 1 = 
(c( 0 y(i)) + 1. 
Let J2’ = (o,Ww,R,O,‘, +, . . . , f p, 1, =) be the natural classical .9-structure in which 
R is the class of lawlike sequences, and let J%‘[-+] be the corresponding Y[+]- 
structure. 
Theorem 1. A[+R] is a classical model of RLS+ [+I. 
Proof. Essentially as in [ 151 allowing for the difference in notation, but relaxing the 
“almost negative” restriction on lawlike comprehension and observing that all instances 
of lawlike comprehension appealed to in that proof were in fact restricted. Open Data 
is verified by induction on the logical form of A(U), using the following key lemma. 
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Lemma 2. rf ‘RLS3 for A(U) holds in A’[-+], so does “RLS3 for 7A(a). 
Proof. Recall that 1 = ( ). Given A(E) satisfying the hypothesis (and with no free 
number variables), define restricted R-formulas J(w,v) and K(w,v) by 
J(w,v) = (Seq(w) 3 Seq(v)) & (v = 11 VP[RLS(& >[B E w > -A(p)]]) 
& (v > 11 V’p[RLS(p) >[p E w * v > A(fl) 
K(w, v) = J(w, v) & Vu(u < v > lJ(w, u)). 
By hypothesis, A[-+] k VwEl!vK(w,v) so there is a predictor rc E R with the property 
that .&[-+I k VwK(w,z(w)). If CI E RLS there is a least x0 at which rc correctly 
predicts IX, so if wg = E(Q) then a E wg * n(wo) and A[-+] k K(wo,rc(wo)). If also 
&[<R] k PA then n(wo) = 1 SO A[-+] b V/?[mS(fi) I@(X) = wo IJ +@>)I. 
3. r-Realizability for Y[-X] 
3.1. Dejinitions and Basic Lemmas 
We use Kleene’s representation of continuous partial mappings F : w. - OCL) by 
their moduli of continuity. If z,c( E mm then {~}[a] is the partial function defined by 
{~)[al(t) =z<(t) * WY((4 *E(y)) > O)Fl. 
If x E o then {r}[x] N {z}[h x]; and {r} = {z}[O]. It will sometimes be useful to 
have a modulus of continuity z with the property that if Seq(u) and t(n) > 0 then 
r(u * V) = r(u) for every sequence number o; any function r with this property will be 
called monotone. 
If cp[O,a] is partial recursive in A then by Kleene’s SF theorem there is a monotone 
function Aor (P[@,GI] primitive recursive in A such that 
usually A will be r. In the proof of Theorem 2 the notation ha cp[O,~] is also 
used when cp[O,a] is simply continuous in its function variables (and hence recur- 
sive in some unspecified A which could in principle be recovered from the defi- 
nition of cp[O,a]). Let Ax cp[O,x] = Acr tp[O,a(O)] and A cp[O] = Ax cp[O], so 
{h cp[Wl~bl = cpF%xl and {A cp[@l) = d@l. 
A r-appropriate interpretation of a list \k = x0,. . .,x,,, ~10,. . , cq, a~,. . . , a,,, of 
distinct variables of the types indicated is now any choice Y of numbers x0,.. . ,x,, 
functions ~0,. . . ,cc~ E w. and numbers ~0,. . , r,,, (representing elements of R via r). 
We also write r[Y] for xc,. . . ,x,, ~(0,. . . , CQ, T(ro), . . . , Qr,). With each list \k = 
Qo, Xl?* of distinct number and lawlike sequence variables and each restricted R-formula 
A(x,y) containing free at most Q’, x, y and in which a, x are free for y (where 
x # y and x, y, a @ Q) we associate a partial function tA( Y) such that for each I’- 
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appropriate interpretation Y of Q: if \dx3! yA(x, y) is true-r[Y] then <A(!?) is defined 
and VxA(x,a(x)) is true-r[Y,[A(Y)]. 
We now define when II E (“w r-realizes-y a formula E of L?[+] all of whose 
distinct free variables are interpreted r-appropriately by the functions and numbers Y. 
1. n r-realizes-y a prime formula P, if P is true-r[Y]. 
2. 7c r-realizes-y A & B, if (rc)c r-realizes-Y A and (rc)~ r-realizes-y B. 
3. n r-realizes-y A V B, if (n(O)),, = 0 and (n)l r-realizes-y A, or (~(0))~ # 0 
and (rc)i r-realizes-y B. 
4. n F-realizes-Y A 3 B, if, if o F-realizes-Y A, then {rc}[c~] T-realizes-Y B. 
5. rc r-realizes-y TA, if 7c r-realizes-Y A 1 1 = 0. 
6. n T-realizes-Y VxA(x), if, for each x E w, {rc}[~] r-realizes-Y,x A(x). 
7. 71 r-realizes-Y 3xA(x), if(n), r-realizes-Y,(n(0))O A(x). 
8. rc r-realizes-y VaA(a), if, for each Y E o, {rc}[r] r-realizes-Y,r A(a). 
9. r~ r-realizes-y 3aA(a), if (n), r-realizes-Y, (~(0))~ A(a). 
10. n r-realizes-Y VctA(a), if, for each CI E wo, {rr}[~] (is completely defined and) 
r-realizes-y, CI A(a). 
11. ;IC r-realizes-y 3ctA(a), if ({(rc),,} is completely defined and) (rr)i r-realizes- 
Y, {(n)o> A(a). 
We say E is r-realized-y if some rc r-realizes-y E. Observe that a prime formula P 
of the form u 4 v is r-realized-y if and only if u[T[Y]], v[T[Y]] E R and u[T[Y]] -iR 
u[T[Y]], since these are the conditions under which P is true-r[Y]. The other important 
difference from the realizability in [ 161 is that a r-realizing-y function z for VaA(a) 
need not be continuous in the intepretation of a since r-realizability uses integer codes 
for elements of R, rather than the sequences themselves, to interpret lawlike sequence 
variables. 
Lemma 3. If E is a formula in which only the distinct variables Q occur free, and 
tf X0 c @ and Q, is a T-appropriate interpretation of a, then E r-realizes-@ E if and 
only if E r-realizes-Y E. 
A formula E of LF[+] will be called strictly almost negative if it contains no V or 
3 except in subformulas of the form 3xP, 3aP or 3ctP where P is of the form s = t 
(where s, t are terms). 
Lemma 4. To each strictly almost negative formula E of P’[-c] containing free only 
9 there is a function EE[Y] = &(Y, t) partial recursive in r such that for each 
r-appropriate interpretation Y of 9 : 
(i) ZfE is r-realized-y then E is true-T[Y], and 
(ii) E is true-r[ Y] if and only if Q[ Y] IS completely defined and T- realizes-Y E. 
Proof. If E is u < v let ca[Y] be At 0. If E is VaA(a) let EE[Y] be ArEA(a)[Y,r]. If 
E is 3aA(a) where A(a) is s = t, let Q[Y] be it (r,O) where r is the least natural 
number such that A(a) is true-r[Y], T(r). (This is partial recursive in r because s, t 
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numeralwise express functions primitive recursive in r[!P] and the interpretation of a.) 
The other cases are as in [ 10, 161. 
Lemma 5. Let 9 be any list of variables, let y, p, b be variables not in 9, and let 
Y, y,lj,r be an appropriate interpretation of the variables. Then 
(i) If A(y) contains free only !P, y and t is a term containing free only 9, y 
and free for y in A(y), and if t(I’[Y], y) is the number expressed by t under the 
I-appropriate interpretation Y, y of @‘, y, then E I-realizes-Y, t(I[Y], y) A(y) if and 
only tf E I-realizes-Y, y A(t). 
(ii) Similarly tf A(/?) contains free only Q,p and u is a functor containing free 
only S, p and free for /? in A(/?). 
(iii) If A(b) contains free only 9,b and g is an R-functor containing only 9,b free 
and free for b in A(b), and zf g[I[Y, r]] is the function expressed by g under the 
r-appropriate interpretation Y,r of @‘, b, then E I-realizes-Y,r A(g) if and only if 
E I-realizes-Y,s A(b), where s = <g(X)=y( Yo,Yz,Y) so I(s) = g[I[Y,r]]. 
3.2. Classical I-Realizability and Classical Truth 
To each list @ = PO, K&i, 92 where !J!o, $2 are distinct number and lawlike sequence 
variables respectively and Qi = ~0,. . . , Q-I are distinct choice sequence variables, and 
each restricted formula E = E(9) in which no variables but Q occur free, we associate 
a function rs[Ya, Y2] = &( Y~o, Y2, t) such that, for each r-appropriate interpretation 
Yo, Y2 of Qo, Xl!‘2 and each t E co: 
1 
1 if Seq(t) and for all Yl = a~, . . . , q-1 with [aa,. . . , q-11 
E RLS, if [as, . . . , ak_,](lh(t)) = t then E is true-r[Y], 
rE[yO, y2](t) = 2 if &q(t) and for all Yi = ~10 ,..., elk-1 with [CQ ,..., a&i] 
E RLS, if [ao,. . . , ak_l](lh(t)) = t then 1E is true-r[Y], 
0 otherwise. 
By Theorem 1, if [a~, . . . , uk___l] E RLS then {rs[Yy~, Y2]}([cto,. . . , uk_1]) is defined and 
equal to 0 or 1 according as E is true-r[ Y] or not, where Y = Y~o, MO,. . , ak__l, Y2 
and in general {Z}(M) N r(Z(~yt(Z(i(y)) > O))ll. 
Lemma 6. To each list Q and each restricted formula E of 2’[+] containing free at 
most the distinct variables U? as above, there is a continuous partial function ~E[Y] 
such that for each r-appropriate interpretation Y of 9 with [Q,. . . ,ak_l] E RLS: 
(i) If E is I-realized-Y then E is true-r[Y], and 
(ii) E is true-IJY] tf and only tf [E[Y] is completely defined and I-realizes-Y E. 
Proof. If E is strictly almost negative, set Is[Y] N EE[Y]. If E is of the form lA, 
set [s[Y] N Rolt 0. Otherwise [s[Y] is determined by induction on the logical form 
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of E as follows. In most cases the verification of (i) and (ii) is straightforward from 
the given information, and will be omitted. 
Assume (i) is true for A and B, and [*[Y], ia[Y] satisfy (ii) for A, B respectively. 
If E is A & B then [s[Y] is ([~[!?l,[n[Y]). If E is AVB we use the z~[Yg, Yz] and 
ZB[ Yo, Yz] for Y as above to define 
(ito, cA[yI) if rA[yO, yZl(wA,B) = 1, 
cE[yl N 
(itl,iB[yl) if TA[yO, yYZI(wA,B) = 2, 
where WA,B( Y) N ~w([Lxo,. . , Q-I] E w & ZA[YO, Ye] > 0 & rn[Ya, Ye] > 0). 
Observe that WA,B is always defined if [as,. . . , ak__l] E RLS, and then by the induc- 
tion hypothesis cs[Y] is completely defined and r-realizes-y E if and only if either 
A is true-r[Y], or A is false-QY] but B is true-r[Y]. 
IfE is A>B, set <s[Y] 2: 1y~n[Y]((y)o~l)+l. If c r-realizes-y A then {[a[Y]}[cr] 
= ~t~E[yl(((t) * %y~E[yl((tj *a(y)> ’ o))OLl) N ittB[yl(t) = cB[‘yl. 
For the quantifier cases we shall assume that the quantified variable is not in the list 
Q’; if it is, first change the quantified variable to one not in 9. If E is &A(x) where 
for each x E o: (i) holds for A(x) with Y,x in place of Y, and ~A(~)[Y,x] satisfies 
(ii) for A(x), then [s[Y] is defined by 
cE[yl(y> N 
i~(x)[Y,(yh Lll((~)~Ll) + 1 if sed.y> and Wy) > 1, 
0 otherwise. 
If E is 3xA(x) with the same hypotheses, let cE[ Y] N (At (WA(x))0 
‘~,~A(~)[Y,(WA(~))O’~I) where WA(x) N ,uw(Seq(w) & Ih(w) > 0 & [aO,...,ak-11 E 
((“‘h,. . .,(w)[h(,&~) & ~A(x)[~Org,(w)O’1, y21(((w)l,. . . h’),+)l, 1) = 1). 
The cases for lawlike function quantifiers are similar, using the indexing func- 
tion r implicitly. If E is VaA(a) then Is[Y](y) N I~(~)[Y,(y)l-l]((y)o-~l) + 1 if 
&q(w) and Zh(w) > 1, 0 otherwise; thus {&[Y]}[r] N [~(~)[yl,r] for each r E o. 
If E is jaA(a) then IE[YI - (At (wA(~))o-~,IA(~)[Y,(wA(~))o’~I) where WA(~) = 
w@q(W) & lb(w) > 0 & [NO,. . . , ak-11 E t(w)1 > * *. 3 b’+h(,,+, )&zA(a)[yO, y2, (w)O 
-ll(((wh,... > (Whh(W)ll )) = 1). 
For the last two cases, let A(/?,aa , . . . , ak- 1) be any restricted formula containing free 
at most *o, Q2 and the distinct arbitrary choice sequence variables 91, /3 shown, such 
that (i) holds for A@, CIO,. . . , ak-1) with Y,P in Place of Yy, and ~A(p,crO,...,,k_,)[Y, Bl 
satisfies (ii) for A(/?, a0,. . . , &_I). 
If E is VflF where F(p,ao ,..., ak-1) is RLS([p,cco ,..., ~lk_i])>A(fi,ao ,..., Q-I), 
then by the case for 3 and Lemma 4 (with the fact that RLS([p, ao, . . . , C&-l]) is strictly 
almost negative), (i) holds for F and there is a Ir[Y, /3] satisfying (ii) for F. Since [r 
is a continuous partial function and Yo, Y2 take values in o, there is a monotone total 
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function CF[ Yo, Yz] such that ir[ Y, /I] N {r~r[ Yo, Yz]}[[/~, ~10,. . , c+.~]]. Define 
MWY) 2 
I 
aF[yO, Y21 ((y>O * [(b>lt... ,(Yhh(y)~l),UO,. .~,+ll) 
if Seq(y) and 
h(y) > 0 and 
Ui = C(i(Zh(y)‘l), 
0 otherwise, 
where in general [us,. . .,u,_1] is 0 unless us,. . . , urn_1 are all sequence numbers of 
the same length, and then [us,. . . , u,_l] = [yo, . . . , y,,-l](m . Zh(uo)) where yi E ui for 
i = O,..., m - 1. Then {~E[W[PI = IF[‘J’,PI f or all /I E ww so [E[Y] satisfies (ii) for 
E, and (i) holds for E by Lemma 4 with the induction hypothesis. 
Finally, suppose E is 3j[BLS([/?, ~(0,. . ., L&-l]) & A(/?,ao,. . .,ak_l)]. By the induc- 
tion hypothesis on A with previous cases and Lemma 4, there is a cu[ Y] satisfying 
(ii) for the predicate 
H = 3w[Seq(w) & VBWS([B,~O,. . .,ak-I]) XP(lh(w)) = w 3 W,~O,. . .,ak-1 )))I1 
where (i) holds for H. By Theorem 1, E is true-r[Y] if and only if H is; moreover 
by the proof of Theorem 1 (see [15]) there is a partial function p[w,ao,. . . , cq-I] 
recursive in r such that if &q(w) and [cQ,. . . ,ctk-I] E us then p[w,cro,. . . ,ak_l] = 
p is completely defined and P(lh(w)) = w and [/?, txo, . . . , ak_11 E RLS. Define 
where 
B = B[*] - p[(~H[~](o)>O, EO,. . . , @k-l]. 
Then cs[Y] satisfies (ii) for E, and (i) holds for E. 
3.3. Consistency of S+ [<] 
Theorem 7. Each closed theorem of S+[<] is r-realized by some function, and hence 
S+[<] and all its subsystems considered herein are classically consistent. 
Proof. To each theorem E of S+[<] containing free at most the distinct variables 
KP = Qa, Qt, 92 of the three types (number, choice and lawlike sequence respectively) 
we provide, by induction on the given deduction of E, a function cp[ Y] = iltcp( Y, t) 
which is continuous in Yr and r-realizes-y E for each r-appropriate interpretation 
Y of Xl!. Each axiom E of S+[+] which is either an axiom of FIM or an instance 
in 2[+] of an axiom schema of FIM is r-realized-y essentially as in [ 10, Theorem 
9.31, since the present notion of realizability extends that of [lo]. There is a loss in 
constructivity; e.g. the cp[Y,x] = An {~~}[t(r[Y,x])] which r-realizes-Y,x an axiom 
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VxA(x) > A(t) by “10N is now primitive recursive in r rather than absolutely. We 
turn now to the new axioms and axiom schemata, giving a continuous cp[Y] for each. 
‘1OR. vaA(a) 1 A(g). cp[V = h {~)[S,(,)=,(~O, yz)l. 
‘11R. A(g) > 3aA(a). cp[Y] = Aa (ti {stX~=y(Y~, Yz),cr). 
“2.2!R. Vx3!yA(x,y) > Zlat/xA(x,a(x)) where A(x,y) is restricted and only 90, Q!z 
occur free in the axiom. q[Y] = ha (J_~~~~~,~~(yl~, Y~),A.x({o}[x])i,~). 
If E is an axiom by ‘RLS1,2,5 or 6 then E is true-r[Y] and restricted, with no 
arbitrary choice sequence variables free, so cp[Y] = is r-realizes-Y E by Lemma 6. 
‘W3,4 can be treated in the same way. If E is one of “WO-2, 5 then E is strictly 
almost negative so Lemma 4 provides the cp[Y] = &E[Y]. 
“KTl. Essentially as in [ 161, 
cpW1 = WA z> Ax b (~tlx3!~r((x)*a(~))>o[~[Y,(~l, al,~)) 
where 
r = W,al = Au {(~~~.)[~l}[~~(~)[~,~ll)o} and 
7-c = ABA~({{~}[~I}[&A(~)[Y, allh. 
For each rule of inference we must show how to provide a continuous r-realizing-y 
function for the conclusion, given such functions for the hypotheses. 
Rule 2. A, A > B / B. Lemma 3 allows us to assume 9 includes all variables free in 
A > B. If a[ Y], 8[ Y] are continuous r-realizing-y functions for A, A > B respectively, 
let cp[~l = ~~[W[dY% 
Rules 9N, 9F, 12N, 12F are handled essentially as in [lo]. The new rules 9R, 12R 
are similar; we treat them here for completeness. 
Rule 9R. C > A(b)/C >VbA(b), where b is not free in C. Suppose that 
29[Y, r] is a continuous r-realizing-y, r function for the hypothesis; then cp[Y] = 
AaAr {fl[Y,rl}[ (T is a continuous r-realizing-y function for the conclusion. 1 
Rule 12R. A(b) > C/3bA(b) > C, where b is not free in C. If 6[Y, Y] is a continuous 
r-realizing-y, Y function for the hypothesis, then cp[ Y] = Aa{8[ Y, (a(O))o]}[(a)i] 
takes care of the conclusion, 
This completes the proof of the theorem. Since 0 = 1 is not r-realized by any 
function, S+[+] and all the formal systems considered in this paper are classically 
consistent. 
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